Business Reciprocity as a Sherman Act Violation: A Generally Accepted, But as Yet Unadjudicated, Doctrine by Ferguson, Donald
Volume 74 | Issue 4 Article 4
September 1972
Business Reciprocity as a Sherman Act Violation: A
Generally Accepted, But as Yet Unadjudicated,
Doctrine
Donald Ferguson
Department of Justice
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donald Ferguson, Business Reciprocity as a Sherman Act Violation: A Generally Accepted, But as Yet Unadjudicated, Doctrine, 74 W. Va. L.
Rev. (1972).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol74/iss4/4
BUSINESS RECIPROCITY AS A SHERMAN
ACT VIOLATION: A GENERALLY
ACCEPTED, BUT AS YET
UNADJUDICATED, DOCTRINE
DONALD FBRGUSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although no court has yet issued a judgment that evidence of
business reciprocity establishes a violation of sections 1 or 2 of the
Sherman Act' there is, nevertheless, an apparent general acceptance
that most, if not all, practices involving such reciprocity violate that
Act. This acceptance is inferred from several grounds, including:
dicta in one Supreme Court and at least two lower court opinions;
the Department of Justice's filing of twelve cases based solely upon
allegations of reciprocity charged as Sherman Act violations; the
settlement of all these cases by consent decrees containing stringent
provisions against pratices constituting or facilitating reciprocity;
and views expressed in legal periodicals.
What may not be so clear, however, is whether practices of
business reciprocity in which the decision to deal with another firm
is made unilaterally and not under coercion or by express agreement
violate the Act. Other uncertainties include possible action by gov-
ernmental regulatory commissions against firms which practice
reciprocity, the possibility of claims by injured firms for treble dam-
* Attorney, Antitrust Division (New York Field Office), Department of
Justice. Member of the West Virginia State Bar. Harvard College 1946,
J.D. Harvard Law School 1949. Alan C. Harnisch, an associate of the
writer in the Antitrust Division, kindly reviewed a draft of the article and
made helpful suggestions for revision but bears no responsibility for its
accuracy or for the opinions expressed herein. The opinions expressed in this
article are the personal views of the author and should not be construed as
reflecting views or policies of the Department of Justice.
'Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970):
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal....
Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970):
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor..
Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970), provides for
jurisdiction in the federal district courts of proceedings in equity to prevent
and restrain violations of the Act.
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ages in private antitrust cases brought under section 4 of the Clayton
Act,' and the possibility of criminal prosecution under the Sherman
Act for corporations and individuals charged with engaging in busi-
ness reciprocity.
Outside the scope of this discussion is the subject of reciprocity
effects, an important criterion in evaluating the possible anticom-
petitive impact of conglomerate mergers under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act' which, however, involves different issues from recipro-
city as conduct in violation of the Sherman Act. Reciprocity effects
pertain to the tendency of firms, absent coercive or voluntary agree-
ment, express or implied, to buy from or otherwise favor those to
whom they sell or to whom they feel obligated for any other reason.
Such effects are attributed to mergers in which the suppliers of one
merger partner are the customers of the other, or there is a poten-
tiality for such relationships.
The practice of reciprocity has been widespread in the American
economy, particularly by large industrial concerns. According to a
1961 survey of purchasing agents 100 per cent of those in the petro-
leum, chemical, iron and steel industries admitted that reciprocity was
a factor in buyer-seller relationships in their companies, while 45
per cent of those in service industries and 36 per cent in consumer
goods industries made the same admission.4 A leading business pub-
lication in 1965 estimated that 60 per cent of the 500 largest indus-
trial corporations in the country employed trade relations managers
to effectuate policies of reciprocal dealing. The Trade Relations
Association, Inc., formed in 1962, was asserted to have 135 large
companies as members with many nonmembers also participating
unofficially.' In the opinion in United States v. Northwest Industries,6
a suit under Clayton section 7 attacking a corporate acquisition, the
2 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
' Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970):
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly.
4 Reciprocity: Where Does the P.A. Stand? PURcHAsNo, Nov. 20, 1961,
at 70-79.
5 McCreary and Guzzardi, A Customer is a Company's Best Friend,
FORTUNE, June 1965, at 180.6 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1088-92 (N.D. Il. 1969).
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court referred to evidence indicating the practice of reciprocity by
numerous large corporations including Alcoa, Allied Chemical,
American Oil, Cities Service, Du Pont, FMC Corp., Goodrich,
Humble Oil, Monsanto, Shell Oil, Tenneco and Texaco. A recent
study of business reciprocity concluded that "(t)he vast majority of
corporations in the industrial market practice reciprocal dealing.
Probably all do." This conclusion was in part based on the author's
interviews of some 30 management personnel in large companies in
the shipping, railroading, chemical, petroleum, basic metals, rubber,
banking, heavy machinery, paper and packaging, printing inks, plas-
tics, and miscellaneous industrial equipment industries!
In view of the apparently pervasive practice of reciprocity by
big business, and the asserted anticompetitive effect thereof on smal-
ler concerns, the significance of any newly evolving and perhaps not
yet widely appreciated antitrust doctrine applicable to such practice
is manifest. It is important therefore to examine the bases claimed to
support the contention that various forms of reciprocal dealing are
now generally regarded by the courts, enforcement authorities and
the antitrust bar as Sherman Act violations.
II. BASES OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Dicta
Apparently the first judicial suggestion of the illegality of recip-
rocity under the antitrust laws was made by Judge Rosenberg in
United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,' a merger case under Clayton
section 7, in which he stated:
What may here be involved is the trade practice known
as 'Reciprocity: This is particularly destructive of compe-
tition because it transforms substantial buying power into a
weapon for 'denying competitors less favorably situated
access to the market.' United States v. Griffith, 344 U. S.
100, 108 (1949). It distorts the focus of the purchaser by
7 F. Finney, Reciprocal Buying and Public Policy 25, 75-77 (1968)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Graduate Division of Business Administration,
University of California at Berkeley).
8218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963), ajfd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.
1963). The cited opinion is believed to be the first in which the practice of
business reciprocity was the subject of antitrust analysis by a federal court.
However, the Federal Trade Commission had held coercive reciprocal dealing
to violate section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45(a)
(1) (1970) (which provides that "Unfair methods of competition in
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are
3
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interposing between him and the traditional standards of
price, quality and service, an irrelevant and alien factor
which is destructive of fair and free competition on the bas-
is of merit. The competitor may thereby suffer loss because
of a circumstance not bearing directly on the worth of
his product. In this situation, it is the relative size and con-
glomeration of business rivals, rather than their competitive
ability, that may determine success. Obviously, this practice
strikes at one of the basic premises of a free enterprise
economy.'
Although these comments were made in the context of a merger
case and were thus directed toward reciprocity effects, the court's
strong condemnation of the practice of reciprocity as "particularly
destructive of competition" clearly implies that that practice by it-
self constitutes a Sherman section 1 violation, given facts which es-
tablish the requisite contract, combination or conspiracy between a
firm and its suppliers and a sufficient amount of interstate commerce
affected. Since Standard Oil v. United States"' it has been clear that
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is "an all embracing enumeration to
make sure that no form of contract or combination by which an
undue restraint of interstate or foreign commerce was brought about
could save such restraint from condemnation.""
The only Supreme Court comment on reciprocity occurred in
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,2 which held defendant's acqui-
sition of another company violated Clayton section 7 where the ac-
quired company had substantial shares of its markets and there was
a probability of reciprocal buying as a result of the acquisition. Re-
ciprocity was termed13
declared unlawful."), in three proceedings in the 1930's: Waugh Equipment
Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931); Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932);
California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937). The Commission appears
not to have undertaken further action against the practice of reciprocity until
the latter half of the 1960's when it accepted affidavits of voluntary com-
pliance from several companies: American Standard, Inc., Assurance of
Voluntary Compliance No. 923 (January 17, 1968); G.A.F. Corp., No. 1556(March 5, 1969); Union-Camp Corp., No. 1519 (January 31, 1969); Chase
Bag Co., No. 1614 (April 28, 1969). See, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE
MERGERS, Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission (sometimes referred
to as the "Mueller Report"), at 6-34 to 6-62 (1969), for an illuminating
description of the practice of reciprocity by American Standard and G.A.F.
Corp.
9218 F. Supp. at 552.
10221 U.S. 1 (1911).
"1Id. at 59.
12 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
'
31d. at 594.
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one of the congeries of anti-competitive practices at which
the antitrust laws are aimed.... A threatened withdrawal
of orders if products of an affiliate cease being bought, as
well as a conditioning of future purchases on the receipt
of orders for products of that affiliate, is an anticompeti-
tive practice.
Again, while made in the context of a merger case, the Court's dic-
tum that reciprocity was one of the practices "at which the antitrust
laws are aimed" clearly indicated a view that the practice was con-
demned by the Sherman Act.
The only decided case in which reciprocity had been charged
as a violation of the Sherman Act was United States v. General Dy-
namics 4 in which the Government alleged that defendant's acquisi-
tion of Liquid Carbonics, a leading producer of carbon dioxide and
industrial gases, violated Clayton section 7 and Sherman section 1. In
addition, the Government alleged as a separate violation of Sherman
section 1 that defendant carried out a special sales program designed
to use its large purchasing power to promote sales of the acquired
company. The court held that defendant's acquisition of Liquid
Carbonics violated Clayton section 7 and Sherman section I due to
a probable lessening of competition in the carbon dioxide market
resulting from reciprocal dealing and ordered divestiture. It declined,
however, to uphold the separate charge that the reciprocal dealing it-
self violated Sherman section 1. That charge, the court said, must be
proved by evidence of reciprocity with respect to "particular con-
tracts involving a given amount of business." 5
The Government's proof included evidence of numerous inci-
dents in which General Dynamics' representatives emphasized its
importance as a customer while soliciting selected suppliers to pur-
chase carbon dioxide and industrial gases from Liquid Carbonics.
The evidence further showed the latter's sales to these accounts
amounted to nearly $6 million in 1960 and increased to nearly $8
million in 1962. The court, however, limited its consideration of the
amount of commerce affected by defendant's reciprocity program to
specific sales of carbon dioxide as to which there was evidence that
"customers' decisions were predicated, or significantly influenced, by
reciprocity. ... "'6 The Government's proof of specific sales of carbon
14 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
5 Id. at 52.16258 F. Supp. at 51.
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dioxide 7 made pursuant to these conditions amounted to a total of
only $177,225. The court deemed this amount insufficient to have a
"not insubstantial"' 8 effect on interstate commerce. It was on this
ground, therefore, that the only charge of reciprocity as a Sherman
Act violation thus far litigated was dismissed.
The court in General Dynamics defined business reciprocity as
"the practice whereby a company, overtly or tacitly, agrees to con-
duct one or more aspects of its business so as to confer a benefit on
the other party to the agreement; the consideration being the return
promise in kind by the other party ..... 19
The most common form of reciprocity, and the one involved in
the cited case, is reciprocal buying. Such buying, the court noted,
ranged from coercive reciprocity, where a firm's substantially larger
purchases from a supplier than the latter's purchases from it are said
to provide a leverage by which additional sales to the supplier can be
obtained by threat of reduction or discontinuance of purchases, to
mutual patronage, where the purchasing power of the parties is rela-
tively equal but they agree to purchase from each other.20 The court
1 The opinion in General Dynamics provided no explanation why sales
of industrial gases made pursuant to reciprocal arrangements were not in-
cluded in the court's consideration of the Sherman § 1 charge of reciprocal
dealing. The Governments complaint, paragraphs 11-13, had included
industrial gases as well as carbon dioxide in its charge that defendant
entered into contracts for reciprocal dealing in violation of Sherman § 1.
Liquid Carbonics' sales of industrial gases appear to have been approximately
equal in dollar amount to its sales of carbon dioxide. Id. at 39, 50.
18The court adopted this phrase from International Salt v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947), where it was held "unreasonable, per se,
to foreclose competitors from any substantial market" by a tying arrange-
ment. The tying arrangement required lessees of defendant's patented salt
dispensing machines to purchase from it salt for use in those machines.
The Court there said that the test was one of absolute rather than relative(market share) foreclosure and that defendant's sales of the tied product
amounting to some $500,000 were "not insubstantial." In Northern Pacific
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958), the Court said that tying arrange-
ments "are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product and a 'not insubstantial'
amount of interstate commerce is affected." In the latest tying case to be
decided by the Supreme Court, Fortner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel, 394 U.S.
495, 501-02 (1969), it was indicated that commerce in the amount of
S190,000 was not "insubstantial." More significantly, the Court stated that
"normally the controlling consideration is simply whether a total amount of
business, substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely
de minimis,' is foreclosed to competitors by the tie .. " This rule, if the
Court adheres to it, may all but eliminate the amount of commerce affected
as an issue in future tying cases and possibly in reciprocity and other types
of antitrust litigation as well.
19258 F. Supp. at 57.2 0 d.
[Vol. 74
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indicated however that both coercive and mutual patronage recipro-
city violated Sherman section 1, analogizing both of these practices to
tie-in sales, where power in one market is used to promote sales in
another. 1
B. Recent Reciprocity Cases Filed by the
Department of Justice
Less than a year after the General Dynamics decision the Gov-
ernment instituted United States v. Geuneral Tire & Rubber Co.2
naming as defendants General Tire and three of its subsidiaries and
alleging a "combination and conspiracy to utilize reciprocity" in vio-
lation of Sherman section 1 and an attempt to monopolize, through
coercion and persuasion of suppliers to purchase products and ser-
vices from defendants, in violation of Sherman section 2. After sev-
eral years of pre-trial proceedings23 this case was terminated by con-
sent decree.14
By alleging a combination and conspiracy among General Tire
and its subsidiaries the Government may have avoided the problem
alluded to by the Court in General Dynamics' of establishing a
section 1 violation, which requires a contract, combination or con-
spiracy, on evidence of a single defendant's unilateral conduct. How-
ever, a year after the filing of General Tire the Supreme Court in
Albrecht v. Herald Co.,26 a private treble-damage action under
Sherman section 1 involving vertical price fixing, set forth an ex-
panded concept of "combination", as that term is used in the Sher-
man Act. Mere acquiescence by one party to an anticompetitive
practice urged by another and accompanied by threat of termination
of dealing was held to create a combination between them. Subse-
quently, in United States v. Container Corp. of America,"' decided
less than a year after Albrecht, the Court held that the practice of
21 Id. at 66.
2 Civil No. C-67-155 (N.D. Ohio, filed March 2, 1967).23 See, United States v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 1968 Trade Cases
ff 72,609 (N.D. Ohio).
24 1970 Trade Cases ff 73,303 (N.D. Ohio).
25 Vendors of General Dynamics to curry favor or protect present sales
to the defendant, might unilaterally decide to purchase the products of Liquid
Carbonic. In such instances, no actual contacts would occur and thus no
agreements would be present to serve as a predicate for a Sherman § 1
violation.... To prove the presence of vendor contracts on condition, parti-
cular contracts with identifiable parties must be introduced into evidence, or
legitimately inferred from the conduct of such identifiable parties. 258 F.
Supp. at 66.26 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968).
27393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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competitors checking with each other as to prices offered to particu-
lar customers constituted a combination or conspiracy under section
1. An agreement could be established, the Court indicated, upon the
inference "that when a defendant requested and received price infor-
mation, it was affirming its willingness to furnish such information in
return.""8 The decision appears to have significant import for the
future application of the term "conspiracy" as used in the Sherman
Act. The reasonably inferred expectations of two or more firms in
their dealings may provide the necessary element of agreement in
situations where no express agreement is indicated or evidence there-
of is lacking. With respect to reciprocity cases, for example, where
there is no evidence of express agreement between two firms to
engage in reciprocal buying, evidence of discussion by their repre-
sentatives of their respective sales and purchase data or of other sim-
ilar circumstances may be held to reasonably justify an inference that
each, by its purchases from the other, is "affirming its willingness"
to engage in reciprocal buying.
All eleven reciprocity cases under the Sherman Act filed by the
Government subsequent to Albrecht29 have each named only a single
defendant who has been charged with violating section 1 of the Act
by "entering into combinations involving reciprocal purchasing ar-
rangements"3" or, in one, by "entering into agreements and combina-
tions involving" such arrangements.' With one exception each de-
fendant has also been charged with violating section 2 of the Act
by attempting to monopolize the requirements of actual and potential
supplier-customers of the defendant for products sold by the defen-
dant." The exception involved the compliant filed against the fifth-
28 1d. at 335.
29 United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., Civil No. 69-728 (W.D. Pa., filed
June 13, 1969); United States v. Evans Products Co., Civil No. 70-C-540
(N.D. In., filed March 6, 1970); United States v. Inland Steel Co., Civil No.
70C-1305 (N.D. Ill., filed June 1, 1970); United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., Civil No. C 70-609 (N.D. Ohio, filed June 29, 1970); United States
v. Armco Steel Corp., Civil No. 7-604 (S.D. Ohio, filed July 31, 1970);
United States v. PPG Industries, Civil No. 70-1273 (W.D. Pa., filed
November 6, 1970); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., Civil No.
70-3102 (E.D. Pa., filed November 10, 1970); United States v. Kennecott
Copper Corp., Civil No. 71-Civ.-119 (S.D.N.Y. filed January 11, 1971);
United States v. National Steel Corp., Civil No. 71-189 (W.D. Pa., filed
February 26, 1971); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, Civil No.
71-491 (W.D. Pa., filed May 26, 1971); United States v. Reynolds Metals
Co., Civil No. 281-71-A (E.D. Va., filed July 14, 1971).30 E.g., U.S. Steel complaint, ff 13.
31 Republic Steel complaint, f" 14.
32 E.g., U.S. Steel complaint, ff 14.
[Vol. 74
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ranking steel company. 3 It is not apparent why that complaint, un-
like the others, omitted a charge of attempting to monopolize in
violation of Sherman section 2. Six of these cases each have as
defendant a single large steel company; one, a diversified company
having railway equipment manufacturing and service operations as
well as substantial plywood and building material manufacturing and
distributing operations; one, a leading producer of plate glass and
chemicals; one, the largest domestic copper producer; and two, the
first and second ranking domestic aluminum producers.
Common to the complaints in all of these cases were allegations
that pursuant to the alleged combination and attempt to monopolize
(as noted, one complaint omitted the attempt to monopolize charge)
each defendant had done certain acts. These allegations may be para-
phrased as follows:
1. compiled and coordinated comparative purchase and sales data
and other information relating to its customers and suppliers;
2. utilized this information to determine which suppliers should
be favored and the extent to which they should be permitted to par-
ticipate in supplying defendant's requirements of goods and services;
3. discussed with actual and potential suppliers and customers
their sales and purchase positions relative to defendant;
4. purchased goods from certain suppliers on the understanding
that such suppliers would purchase goods or services from defen-
dant.34
It will be noted that the first three of these allegations concern
the defendant's alleged compilation and use of comparative purchase
and sales data. Since the Government's proof in General Dynamics
included evidence of defendant's regular compilation of purchase
33 United States v. National Steel Corp., Civil No. 71-189 (W.D. Pa.,
filed February 26, 1971).
347These allegations have been pleaded in substantially uniform language
in all the complaints filed after Albrecht until the recently-filed complaints
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America and United States v. Reynolds
Metals Co. (cited supra, note 29). The charging portions of these latter two
complaints, g[ 13 and 10 respectively, are in some respects couched in different
phraseology but in substance do not appear at variance with the earlier
complaints. The Reynolds Metals complaint does not specifically allege that
defendant compiled comparative purchase and sales data but from the
allegation (I 10(e)) ) that defendant "(d)iscussed with actual and potential
suppliers their sales and purchase positions relative to Reynolds" it would
appear that the compilation of comparative data in some form is involved
in this allegation.
9
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data3 and the General Tire complaint alleged that defendants "di-
rected their respective purchasing personnel to report their purchases
to General Tire's Trade Relations Department"" it can be said that
a defendant's alleged systematic compilation of this type of informa-
tion has been a distinguishing feature of every Sherman Act recip-
rocity case filed by the Government up to this time. The Govern-
ment's concentration thus far on cases allegedly involving such sy-
stematic compilations is indicative of the significance accorded this
type of activity.
There would appear to be little use for information on compara-
tive sales and purchases other than the implementation of a recipro-
cal dealing policy. A company may claim that it compiles this infor-
mation for legitimate purposes such as market and purchasing studies.
Any claim of this nature should be subjected to scrutiny. From the
compilations themselves and from related documents it may be pos-
sible to determine whether the data is collected in a form suitable
for such studies or whether the system of compilation concentrates
on data primarily useful for determining the balance of trade be-
tween the company and its supplier-customers. If little or no effort
is made to compile sales and purchase figures for wholesale and re-
tail customers, for example, or for others with whom the company is
unlikely to be able to engage in reciprocal dealing, such as govern-
ment agencies and institutions, the claim will be unpersuasive. Fur-
thermore, if the company does little in the way of preparing market
or purchasing studies which utilize such compilations the claim will
probably not stand up. Considerable expense is involved in compiling
this type of information for a large company and any mere casual
or infrequent use of the data for legitimate purposes does not per-
suade that such is its main function. There may also be related docu-
ments, which the company may be required to produce under pro-
cess, clearly evidencing that the purchase and sales data have been
used for determining the company's balance of trade with its sup-
plier-customers.
In United States v. ITT (Hartford) ,7 a merger case under Clay-
ton section 7, the Court said that "such data would appear to be
necessary to practice reciprocity." 8 The Court in this instance may
35 258 F. Supp. at 42-45.
36 f 25(c).
37 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).38 Id. at 790.
[Vol. 74
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have overstated the point since it must be recognized that a firm
could engage in relatively simple reciprocal arrangements, having
substantial anticompetitive effects nevertheless, without the benefit
of comparative sales and purchase data. Any organized or systematic
practice of reciprocity, however, would seem to require the compila-
tion of this type of data.
All of these cases have been terminated by final judgments
(consent decrees) entered upon the consent of the Government and
of each defendant.39
The consent decrees, which terminate after ten years, appear
to afford the Government almost all the injunctive relief prayed for
in the complaints. Pursuant to the salient provisions of these decrees
each defendant, its officers and employees, was enjoined and restrain-
ed from committing certain acts. These provisions may be para-
phrased as follows:
1. purchasing products or services from any supplier on the con-
dition or understanding that purchases by defendant will be condi-
tioned upon defendant's sales to such supplier;
2. communicating to suppliers that in purchasing products or ser-
vices preference will be given to any supplier based upon defendant's
sales to such supplier;
3. discussing with any customer or supplier the relationship be-
tween purchases by defendant from and sales by defendant to such
customer or supplier;
4. preparing statistical compilations which compare purchases
from any supplier with sales to such supplier; and
5. issuing to personnel with primary sales (purchasing) responsi-
bilities any lists or notices which pertain to purchases (sales) that
have been made by defendant from (to) particular customers (sup-
pliers)."4
39The final judgments are reported or were entered as follows: U.S.
Steel, 1969 Trade Cas. f1 72,826 (W.D. Pa.); Inland Steel, 1970 Trade Cas.
It 73,197 (N.D. Ill.); Republic Steel, 1970 Trade Cas. It 73,246 (N.D. Ohio);
Armco Steel, 1970 Trade Cas. It 73,283 (S.D. Ohio); PPG Industries, 1970
Trade Cas. ff 73,376 (E.D. Pa.); Kennecott Copper, 1971 Trade Cas. ff
73,437 (S.D.N.Y.); Evans Products, 1971 Trade Cas. It 73,450 (N.D. Ill.);
National Steel, 1971 Trade Cas. It 73,495 (W.D. Pa.); Aluminum Co. of
America, 1971 Trade Cas. It 73,587 (W.D. Pa.); Reynolds Metals, 1971
Trade Cas. g[ 73,626 (E.D. Va.).4 0 The U.S. Steel decree, see. V, It (B), prohibited the issuance to
purchasing personnel of lists or notices which identify customers and their
11
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In addition, each defendant was ordered and directed to do
certain things, including acts of the following nature:
6. abolish or refrain from reestablishing units variously known as
the Trade Relations Division, Business Development Division, or
Commercial Relations Department or Section and to refrain from
establishing any successor offices or positions having the same or
similar duties involving reciprocal purchasing arrangements;
7. issue to each officer and employee having sales or purchasing
responsibilities a policy directive prohibiting reciprocal dealing ar-
rangements; and
8. furnish a copy of the consent decree to and by written notice
advise each supplier from whom defendant has purchased, or custo-
mer to whom it has sold, more than $25,000, (or, in several decrees,
$50,000), of products or services during any year of the three years
preceding entry of the decree that all of its officers and employees
are prohibited from engaging in reciprocal dealing arrangements.
The General Tire decree" contained provisions substantially
similar to the foregoing. However, it went further than the other
decrees in several significant respects. It prohibited defendants, their
officers and employees from belonging to or participating in the
activities of the Trade Relations Association, Inc.42 and from assign-
ing a trade relations function to any office or position.4" It also ord-
ered each defendant to issue a policy directive to all officers and
employees which, in addition to forbidding reciprocal dealing, re-
quired those having purchasing responsibilities to make purchasing
decisions "based upon consideration of price, quality, service and
financial responsibility. . ." with no consideration to be given to the
fact that a supplier does or does not buy or use the products or ser-
vices sold by defendants." Specifically included as a purchasing de-
cision was the placing of any firm on any bidding list or the desig-
nation of any firm as a qualified bidder. All officers and employees
were to be forbidden from "influencing, requesting or suggesting"
purchases or which specify or recommend that purchases be made from
any of such customers but this decree does not contain a specific provision
prohibiting the issuance to sales personnel of lists or notices which identify
suppliers.
41 1970 Trade Cas. fr 73,303 (N.D. Ohio).
42 Final judgment, sec. VI, ff (C).
43 Id., sec. VI, f" (A).44 Final judgment, sec. Vi, " (D)(3).
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to those having purchasing responsibilities to make any exception to
this policy. 5
These consent decrees provided, as is customary, that consent
to entry was made without trial, adjudication or admission of any
issue of fact or law. Also customary, was the provision in each decree
that the complaint "states claim upon which relief may be granted
against the defendant under § § 1 and 2 . ..of the Sherman Act,
as amended." 46 Thus, while the decrees did not, of course, con-
stitute evidence or admission of wrongdoing on the part of any de-
fendant they did signify the concurrence of defense counsel that the
allegations of the complaints, which related solely to reciprocal deal-
ing and acts in effectuation thereof, set forth violations of the Sher-
man Act for which relief may be granted. However, the significance
of this point must be qualified by acknowledging that defendants and
their counsel may agree to enter into consent decrees when they
deem it in their best interest to do so even though counsel may be
of the opinion that the complaint fails to allege an antitrust violation.
C. Comments in Legal Periodicals
For an issue which has yet to be decided by the courts, the sub-
ject of reciprocity as a Sherman Act violation has engendered an
unusually large number of law review articles. Presumably, this is
due to the prevalence of the practice in the business world and to
the uncertainties attributable to the lack of adjudication. The arti-
cles have not dealt so much with interpretation of decisions, for
General Dynamics is the only Sherman Act case in the field, as with
analysis of the competitive effects of reciprocity in its various forms.
Most articles appearing in law reviews have expressed the opin-
ion that business reciprocity violates the Sherman Act."7 A few com-
mentators have taken the position that application of a per se rule of
illegality should be limited to the coercive form of reciprocity and
advocated that other forms be tested by the standard of reasonable-
ness in the particular setting in which they occur." As at least one
45 Id., sec. VI, ff (D) (4).46 Sec. I of each final judgment cited in note 39, supra. As noted, the
National Steel complaint did not charge a violation of Sherman § 2.
4 See, e.g., Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77
HAav. L. REv. 873 (1964); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1313, 1386-91 (1965); Handler,
Gilding, the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for Arrows, 66 COLum. L.
REv. 1, 5-8 (1966); Flinn, Reciprocity and Related Topics Under the Sherman
Act, 37 AlNTrRusT L.J 156, 163-167 (1967); Ford, Reciprocity, Advisory
Procedures and Class Actions, 1969 UTvii L. REv. 633.48 E.g., Handler, supra note 47, at 10.
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writer has pointed out, however, the practice of reciprocity system-
atically or by agreement can be just as injurious to competition as
the coercive form since the result in any case is the cutting off of
suppliers who cannot or do not buy the products of the reciprocal
dealer.49 The question of the applicability of a per se rule to recip-
rocity practiced by agreement or by systematic procedures will be
discussed subsequently.
There remains, however, one category of writing in the subject
area which warrants examination and comment. Certain writers have
undertaken to show by economic analysis that the practice of recip-
rocity can not increase a firm's market power but simply provides a
different way for the firm to exercise such power as it already has."0
In competitive markets, it is pointed out, there is little incentive to
engage in reciprocity since sellers are able to dispose of their output
at the market price. Also, no firm in a competitive market accounts
for a large enough share to have leverage over suppliers. It is sug-
gested, therefore, that when firms in competitive markets engage in
reciprocity they do so in order to promote goodwill with supplier-
customers, to reduce selling costs, or to achieve greater stability of
sales to counter fluctuations of demand."1 It is denied, however, that
reciprocity becomes anticompetitive under these conditions by fore-
closing competitors from the business of firms engaging in the prac-
tice.
If the practicing firms are selling to each other at noncompeti-
tive prices then it is said that competitors could overcome the recip-
rocal dealing by offering competitive prices. If the firms are doing
business with each other at prices determined by competition the
argument is made that competitors are still not foreclosed but would
simply have to make offers sufficiently advantageous to the practic-
ing firms to induce them to abandon reciprocal dealing. Since com-
petitors must usually offer more advantageous prices, quality or ser-
vice to capture business enjoyed by an existing supplier it is argued
that reciprocal dealing is really not different from any other form of
non-price competition.
It would seem, however, that some foreclosure may result from
reciprocal dealing even where the practicing firms are selling to
49 Hausman, supra note 47, at 879-882.
50 See, e.g., Note, Conglomerate Mergers and the Theory of Reciprocity,
22 STAN. L. RaV. 812 (1970); Note, Reciprocal Dealing, 76 YALE L.J. 1020
(1967).
-5 22 STAN. L. REv. at 820-21.
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each other at competitive prices. Competitors, or some of them, may
not be able to offer prices sufficiently advantageous to induce such
firms to abandon the practice. If the market is competitive, profit
margins can be expected to be small and only slight reductions may
be possible if sales are to be made at a profit. A slight reduction, how-
ever, may not provide sufficient inducement for a firm engaged in re-
ciprocal dealing to switch suppliers and at the same time forego its
own sales to the existing supplier. The argument that competitors must
usually offer more advantageous prices, quality or service to supplant
an existing supplier and therefore can also do so to capture business
from firms engaged in reciprocal dealing appears not to take into
account that reciprocity becomes an additional obstacle under these
circumstances. An even greater inducement therefore in the form of
lower prices or otherwise would seem to be required to pursuade the
buyer to switch suppliers than would be expected without the element
of reciprocity. As noted, however, in competitive markets profit mar-
gins may be too small to make offers sufficiently attractive to over-
come the dual obstacles of reciprocity and the prospect firm's re-
luctance to change suppliers. Consequently, it would seem that fore-
closure may result from reciprocal dealing even when practiced at
competitive prices.
In oligopolistic markets it is argued that if a firm has buying
power it may use it either to obtain lower prices from its suppliers or
to coerce them into engaging in reciprocal dealing but not both.
Theoretically, the power would be exhausted by its full application to
one of these purposes and nothing would remain which could be
exercised for the other. Therefore, it is claimed, a firm with buying
power cannot increase its market share by engaging in reciprocity.
According to this type of analysis, new entrants should have little
difficulty in obtaining business in oligopolistic supplier markets be-
cause the existing firms are selling at noncompetitive prices which
the entrant should be able to undercut. Consequently, it is urged,
there is no foreclosure and no anticompetitive effects from the prac-
tices of reciprocity in these markets either.52
Considering first the argument that reciprocity does not raise
entry barriers in oligopolistic markets it is believed that this view
52 d., at 823: "Thus, even in a market where all firms practice recipro-
city with their suppliers, there is no reason why reciprocity should lessen
the chances of successful entry, provided the new entrant could match the
terms of the established suppliers. This is particularly true in concentratedsupplier markets where established firms are earning supracompetitive profits.
Reciprocity, then, does not foreclose competitors, except on equal terms, and
it cannot be used to increase horizontal market power.'
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fails to attach sufficient importance to the entry barriers which exist
in such markets absent reciprocal dealing. By definition oligopolistic
markets are those in which barriers are high due to such factors as
large capital requirements, difficult technology protected by patents
or secret processes, or limited natural resources. A market cannot
properly be considered oligopolistic unless entry is substantially de-
terred by such factors. A firm considering an attempt to enter a
market under these circumstances presumably will consider every
competitive factor including those affecting its ability to sell its out-
put. It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the potential new
entrant would not be additionally deterred from its attempt by its
discovery that a substantial share of the oligopolistic market is sub-
ject to reciprocal dealing arrangements. To attempt entry confronted
by this situation surely requires greater resolve, or compensating ad-
vantages of a higher degree, than would otherwise be required.
Furthermore, the existing firms practicing reciprocity in the
oligopolistic market have advantages over the new entrant attempting
to supplant them at particular accounts through offers of lower prices.
The existing firms should be able to meet lower prices offered by the
new entrant to such accounts without undue effect on their overall
profits since they are selling at supracompetitive prices to other ac-
counts. They may also be able to shift their reciprocal buying from
less threatened accounts to those which the new entrant is making its
strongest efforts to capture, thereby increasing the reluctance of the
latter accounts to switch suppliers. The reciprocal dealing can be
made more attractive to threatened accounts by increasing the prices
which the existing firms are willing to pay for their reciprocal pur-
chases, by upgrading the quality of the products or services sold, or
by assuming certain freight or other costs normally borne by the
threatened accounts. The existing firms practicing reciprocity have
the advantage of great flexibility, therefore, in countering the efforts
of a new entrant attempting to supplant them. If the considerations
outlined are valid, potential new entrants to an oligopolistic market
would properly consider the use of reciprocity by existing firms in
that market a disadvantage to be added to the other hurdles normally
surrounding such markets. Any raising of entry barriers effects fore-
closure.
Finally, the argument that a firm having buying power can exer-
cise it fully either by obtaining the lowest price from its suppliers or
by requiring them to engage in reciprocity, but not both, may be
[Vol. 74
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questioned. It is conceded that if a firm's buying power is fully exer-
cised to obtain the lowest price that no leverage remains by which to
insist that a supplier buy from the firm at above-market prices. It
would seem, however, that the firm may still have some residuum of
power after bargaining for the lowest price from a supplier which can
be applied to aspects of their dealing not involving prices or costs.
The purchase by a supplier of products or services from the firm at
market prices would not be an aspect involving prices or costs (un-
less substantial costs were involved in switching from another sup-
plier). Would not the firm with buying power, after using that power
to obtain the lowest price from a supplier, still be able to insist upon
reciprocal purchase by the latter as long as the former was willing to
sell at market prices? In the bargaining between the firm and its
supplier it must be presumed that the latter, confronted by the firm's
buying power, has agreed to sell at a lower than normal price but at
a level which is still profitable. The supplier's costs may preclude fur-
ther concessions on price but there appears to be no reason why he
should not be willing to grant any additional concession not affecting
price or costs which the firm may demand, including reciprocal pur-
chases at market prices. If this is true, then the firm with buying
power can fully exercise that power to obtain the lowest price and at
the same time expand its sales through coercive reciprocity. Barriers
to entry would also be raised under these circumstances since, for
reasons outlined above, a new entrant would appear to be forced to
sell at lower prices to obtain the supplier's business because of the
reciprocal dealing than would be required in the absence of that
factor.
III. SOME UNSETTLED ISSUES OF RECIPROCITY
AS A SHERMAN ACT VIOLATION
A. The Various Forms of Reciprocity as Violations
Coercive reciprocity, mutual patronage, and organized or sy-
stematic reciprocity have been adopted for purposes of this discus-
sion as terms which seem reasonably descriptive of the apparently
more common practices by which companies exercise their buying
power to promote sales. Secondary reciprocity refers to situations in-
volving third parties, such as an arrangement between company A
and its supplier B whereby the latter agrees to purchase from A's
customer C in exchange for As purchases from B. Conglomerate
reciprocity refers to the practices of a firm which operates in two or
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more distinct industries and has buying power in one market which
it exercises to promote sales in an unrelated market.
In General Dynamics the court indicated that both coercive re-
ciprocity and mutual patronage" would have been held per se viola-
tions of Sherman section 1 had there been proof of a "not insubstan-
tial" amount of commerce affected. 4 "Reciprocity," the court said,
"whether mutual or coercive, serves to exclude competitors by the
exercise of large scale purchasing power."5
Any contract, combination or conspiracy which unreasonably
restrains competition in or affecting interstate commerce violates
Sherman section 1.56 Moreover, where the subject conduct is deemed
to have a "pernicious effect on competition" and to lack "any redeem-
ing virtue" it is conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and is said
to constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act.5" Where the co-
ercion of large buying power is employed to exact reciprocal pur-
chasing by a supplier there are two effects: 1) the freedom of choice
of the supplier is impaired, and 2) competitors are excluded from
making sales to the supplier. These effects may be fairly judged as
pernicious to competition. The absence of any apparent "redeeming
virtue" in the form of economies of distribution58 or otherwise indi-
cates that this practice is properly relegated to the per se category of
Sherman Act restraints.
Where two firms having a relatively equal balance of trade be-
tween them agree to buy from each other, their mutual patronage
excludes competitors but their freedom of choice in selecting sup-
pliers remains unimpaired. The court in General Dynamics consid-
ered the factor of exclusion of competitors sufficiently anticompeti-
5 3 These terms have been defined previously. See text accompanying note
20 supra.
54 258 F. Supp. at 65-66.55 1d. at 66.56 Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911).
57 Northern Pacific v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
58 It has been suggested that under certain circumstances reciprocity can
effect economies of distribution. See, Adelman, Recent Reports on Antitrust
Policy: An Economist's View, 25 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 566, 572 (1970).
Presumably, any such economies would result from reduced selling costs.
If the lower selling costs were reflected in lower prices there would be
legitimate economies of distribution. The seller who is prepared to reduce
prices, however, could probably obtain the business on that basis alone (per-
haps with comparable savings in selling costs) without the need for a
reciprocal arrangement. If a reciprocal arrangement did bring about lower
selling costs but the price was not correspondingly reduced no socially useful
economies of distribution would be effected.
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tive by itself to bring mutual patronage within the interdiction of the
per se rule also." In the context of mutual patronage practiced by
large companies having leading market positions the court's position
seems warranted. The reciprocal dealing of such firms can be expect-
ed to cause substantial market foreclosure with resultant injury to
small competitors. The harder case is the effect of mutual patronage
practiced by small firms having relatively insignificant market shares.
The exclusion of competitors under these circumstances may have
little or no discernible effect on competition. Nevertheless, it is not
unlikely that the courts will apply the per se rule to small firms as
well as large. The purposes of the per se rule, which are to provide
certainty in the law and make unnecessary elaborate proofs of market
shares and economic conditions,6 are better served by giving it a
general applicability without exceptions. Furthermore, in the absence
of any apparent "redeeming virtues" the practice can be condemned
even as to small firms without fear of interfering with proper busi-
ness operations.
Another form of reciprocity consists of a firm's organized pro-
gram of directing purchases to those suppliers which purchase from
it. An organized program (also sometimes referred to as systematic
reciprocity), may be considered as one in which one or more com-
pany officials, who may be given such titles as director of trade re-
lations or vice-president for corporate development,6 are assigned
to compile comparative data on the company's purchases from and
sales to its suppliers and customers and to coordinate purchases with
sales so that those suppliers who are also good customers receive pre-
ference. If the coordination is carried to the point of relating purchas-
es to sales arithmetically in accordance with some ratio or formula
the program may be considered systematic (although, as noted, that
term is sometimes applied to what is here called organized recipro-
city). For the purpose of considering the legality of organized or
systematic reciprocity it will be assumed that the firm so engaged
does not attempt to coerce or make mutual patronage agreements
with its suppliers but confines itself to unilateral decisions regarding
the placement of purchase orders with suppliers.
It is believed that the organized or systematic forms of recipro-
city also violate Sherman section 1. As with the other forms there is
59 258 F. Supp. at 66.6 0 Northern Pacific v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
61 See, Finney, supra, note 7.
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a use of purchasing power to exclude competitors which may be no
less effective because express agreements with suppliers are avoided.
If anything, an organized or systematic program persistently adhered
to may become the most pervasive form of reciprocity, maximizing
the use of the firm's purchasing power for anti-competitive purposes.
Reciprocity practiced in this manner should be easily distinguishable
from purchases made according to normal purchasing criteria. The
assignment of personnel to coordinate purchases and sales, the com-
pilation of comparative data, and internal documents evidencing a
program under which purchases are related to sales all serve to dis-
tinguish these forms of reciprocity from normal sales and purchases.
While Sherman section 1 requires a contract, combination or conspi-
racy involving two or more parties there would seem not to be a
problem in this connection. Under the Albrecht" interpretation, the
practicing firm can be alleged to have engaged in a combination with
its supplier-customers, assuming there is at least some evidence that
supplier were aware of the firm's reciprocity policy or of the likeli-
hood of their sales to the firm being terminated or reduced for fail-
ure to engage in reciprocal buying in amounts satisfactory to the
firm."' Evidence that suppliers knew that the firm assigned an offi-
cial to conduct trade relations or to compile comparative purchase
and sales data might by itself be sufficient to establish such an aware-
ness. Or, under the rationale of Container Corp.," a conspiracy be-
tween the practicing firm and its suppliers may be alleged where
there is evidence supporting an inference that purchases were made
upon the mutual expectation that reciprocal purchase orders would
be forthcoming.
Furthermore, the unilateral acts of the firm engaged in organiz-
ed or systematic reciprocity are subject to attack under section 2 of
the Sherman Act as an attempt to monopolize the market constituted
62 390 U.S. at 147-50.
63 There is a suggestion in Albrecht that a combination might be held to
exist between a firm engaged in an anticompetitive practice and its customers
even though the latter could have had little or no knowledge of the firm's
purpose. After holding that defendant newspaper publisher, which had
objected to plaintiff home delivery carrier's charging a higher price than
that suggested and had replaced plaintiff with a new carrier, was engaged
in a combination with the latter the Court referred to the possibility of a
combination existing between the publisher and plaintiff's home delivery
customers: "Plaintiff's amended complaint did allege a combination between
respondent and petitioner s customers. Because of our disposition of this case
it is unnecessary to pass on this claim. It was not, however, a frivolous
contention." 390 U.S. at 150, n. 6.64 393 U.S. at 335. See, text accompanying notes 27, 28 supra.
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by the demand of its suppliers for the lines of products and services
sold by the firm. As noted, all but one of the Government complaints
filed since General Dynamics have included such charges of attempts
to monopolize in violation of section 2.
B. Possible Consequences Arising from Reciprocity Conduct
1. Regulatory Commission Proceedings
If a company practicing reciprocity has a division or subsidiary
in a regulated industry it may suffer loss of licenses or other adverse
regulatory action.
An illustration of how this may occur was provided by Federal
Communication Commission proceedings involving General Tire &
Rubber Co. which, as noted earlier," was a defendant, along with
three subsidiaries, in a Government complaint charging reciprocity
filed in 1967 and settled by consent decree in 1970. In 1970 a hear-
ing examiner for the FCC recommended that RKO-General, one of
the subsidiaries named as a defendant in the reciprocity case, be
denied renewal of its television station license in Los Angeles on two
grounds. One ground was the poor quality of its programs. The other
was evidence that General Tire had purchased from suppliers on
condition that the latter purchase advertising time from the station.
The examiner reasoned that the practice of reciprocity might
adversely affect television programming quality, the service provided
by the station, and competition in nonregulated industries66 (it would
also affect competition among television stations in the subject area).
The Department of Justice filed a brief with the FCC taking no posi-
tion on whether the examiner's findings with respect to reciprocity
were supported by the evidence but indicating that if the Commission
concluded that the examiner's findings did have support in the record
then such findings should be given great weight by the Commission.
The Justice Department brief expressed the view that reciprocity was
a per se violation of the antitrust laws and that ordinarily the Com-
mission should not renew a license where it has found the licensee to
have engaged in an antitrust violation.6"
6- See text accompanying note 22-24 supra.66 RKO General Inc., F.C.C. Dockets 16,679 and 16,680.67 1d., Department of Justice filing June 10. A recent action by the FCC
in this matter is reported in 31 F.C.C. 2d 7070 (1970). See, Address by Mr.
Donnem, Director of Policy Planning in the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice, Association of Interstate Commerce Commission Practitioners
in Louisville, Kentucky, June 17, 1970, entitled Diversification of Transporta-
tion Companies - Some Antitrust Considerations.
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2. Treble Damage Claims
Firms practicing reciprocity may be subject to treble damage
claims in private actions if competitors, suppliers, customers or
others can establish the fact of damage and a casual connection be-
tween the illegal reciprocal dealing and the injury to their "business
or property."68
Assuming the private plaintiff has evidence to establish illegal
reciprocal dealing the perhaps greater difficulty remains of proving
damage to his own business or property and the causal connection
between that damage and the defendant's practice of reciprocity.69
Where the firm practicing reciprocity is in an oligopolistic in-
dustry, and particularly if it is the dominant firm, the possibility of
establishing a causal connection between the illegal activity and in-
jury to a competitor, supplier or customer appears much stronger
than where the treble damage defendant has a relatively small share
of a market composed of a sizeable number of companies. Even in
an oligopolistic market, however, it may be difficult to establish that
a plaintiff would have made sales to specific customers had it not
been for defendant's reciprocal arrangements with such customers.
Two private cases have been filed which present in an unusual
context the issues of injury to business or property and of casual con-
nection.7" Plaintiff in each case was alleged to be a beneficiary of
trust accounts managed by a leading New York bank. Each complaint
reportedly alleged that the defendant bank entered into understand-
ings with broker-dealers whereby securities transactions in trust ac-
counts were allocated to such broker-dealers in proportion to their
deposits and loan business. Trust beneficiaries as a class were alleged
to have been injured because these arrangements foreclosed oppor-
tunities to obtain portfolio advice available from other broker-dealers,
interfered with the obtaining of brokerage services on the basis of
quality of performance, impaired the banks' judgment as to proper
portfolio turnover, and resulted in inadequate use of over-the-counter
68Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), provides: "Any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained.. .."
69 [1955-1968] A.B.A., AinrnRusT DEVELOPMENTs, 274-310; A.B.A. ANn-
TRusT DEVELOPmNTs, 61-76 (Supp. 1970).7 0 Schaffner v. Chemical Bank, No. 492 ATRR, A-10, 11 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed December 4, 1970); Ruskay v. Morgan Guaranty, Wall Street Journal,
December 16, 1970, at 11, col. 3.
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broker-dealers for purchase and sale transactions. Injunctive relief as
well as treble damages were prayed for.
3. Criminal Prosecution
A violation of the Sherman Act may be prosecuted by civil pro-
ceedings, criminal action or both.7" The problem of possible unfair-
ness to defendants indicted in criminal proceedings for conduct not
known by them to be unlawful was considered in a report prepared
in 1967 for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice:
The Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Act is
not unconstitutionally vague. But an indictment in a parti-
cular case might unfairly attack conduct not known to the
defendants to be unlawful. The solution of the Antitrust
Division to this problem of potential unfairness has been to
lay down the firm rule that criminal prosecutions will be
recommended to the Attorney General only against willful
violations of the law, and that one of two conditions must
appear to be shown to establish willfulness. First, if the
rules of law alleged to have been violated are clear and es-
tablished - describing per se offenses - willfulness will
be presumed. The most common criminal violation of the
antitrust laws is price fixing; upwards of 80 per cent of the
criminal cases filed charge conspiracies to fix prices. Sec-
ond, if the acts of the defendants show intentional viola-
tions - if through circumstantial evidence or direct testi-
mony it appears that the defendants knew they were vio-
lating the law or were acting with flagrant disregard for the
legality of their conduct - willfulness will be presumed. 71
Dicta in the Supreme Court's Consolidated Foods and district
court's General Dynamics opinions support the view that business re-
ciprocity will be held illegal per se when that issue is adjudicated in
some appropriate future case. The criminal prosecution of companies
and individuals participating in reciprocal arrangements is, therefore,
a possibility to be seriously considered. A recent Assistant Attorney
7 Violation of the Sherman Act is a misdemeanor punishable by fine
not exceeding $50,000 and by imprisonment not exceeding one year. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).7 2 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, Task Force Report: Cmsn AND ITS IMpACT, AN ASS S MNT
110 (1967).
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General in charge of the Antitrust Division in a public address
warned that "we believe systematic reciprocity still continues in some
major industries, and we expect to file additional cases against the
practice in the not too distant future. At this juncture, we cannot
rule out the possibility of criminal prosecution."73
IV. CONCLUSION
Business reciprocity as a Sherman Act violation has been one of
the most important antitrust developments of recent years. Virtually
unheard of before the filing of the General Dynamics complaint in
1962, reciprocity as conduct violative of the antitrust laws has bur-
geoned into a major area of antitrust enforcement with eleven Gov-
ernment cases filed in the past two years. Undoubtedly these cases
have brought about substantial changes in ways of doing business
not only by the companies directly involved as defendants but by
many others which have taken steps to conform their sales and pur-
chasing activities to the standards incorporated in the consent de-
crees.
It is remarkable that this development occurred without benefit
of a single case having been tried and a court holding that evidence
of reciprocal arrangements had established a Sherman Act violation.
However, as this article has attempted to demonstrate, there is
ample basis for the position that most, if not all, forms of reciprocal
dealing violate the Sherman Act, particularly where the firm engaged
in such dealing is a large company or an important factor in its in-
dustry.
7 3 Address by Richard W. MeLaren, former Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, to the New York State Bar Association, Antitrust Law
Section, in New York City, Jan. 28, 1971.
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